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Moral Responsibility: 
A Story, an Argument, and a Vision 
Stephen J. J'v!orse 
The concept of moral responsibility and associated concepts and practices, such as human 
agency, praise, and blame. play an undeniably importan t part in our lives. But what does it 
mean to be a morally responsible person-an agent that can fairly be praised and blamed, 
rewarded and punished. for one 's intentional actions') Many people look for a sec ure 
foundation to ground concepts as important to us as responsibility. Most notable among the 
seekers are theologians and secular metaphysicians, who try to justify responsibility with 
speculations and arguments about the divine or ultimate reason. r am unconvincecl by these 
accounts , however, and believe that no ultimate. uncontroversial justification can be found. 
There is simply no way to know about the exi stence of God or the genuine ontology of the 
uni verse . What is more disquieting, if we were convinced that God or metaphysical moral 
reality exi sted . such a conclusion would not lead to uncontroversial concrete answers to the 
specific questions of morals and politics that vex human life. For example, even if we agree 
th at in principle there are ontol ogically correct answers to every moral question , does this tell 
us clearly whether. say. the death penalty or abortion is ever justified? On ep istemological 
grounds al one , then . if foundations ex ist , we will never know that we have reached rock 
bottom. 
J will offer instead a story. an argument, and a vi sion about how moral responsibility is 
possibl e and why it is desirable. My account is an expl icitly internal interpretati on and 
defe nse of our present moral responsibility concepts and prac tices. Responsibility and its 
pract ices. like the co ncept of law and legal institutions. are products of human culture and can 
only be justitied by the tools of justification that a particular cu lture provides. Although 
cultural products. including theories of knowledge and justifica ti on. may be temporall y and 
geographicall y di ve rse. they are nonetheless as real features of our lives as gravity and death, 
and they can be rationall y analyzed. To give an internaL constructivist account docs not 
commit one to '·anything goes·' relati vism or to unfettered pragmatism. We can assess the 
quality of the reasons that support moral responsibility. ancl I suggest that res pons ibility is 
both coherent and desirable. fncleed, our li ves and society wouicl be impove ri shed without it. 
eve n if it were possibl e to give it up. which I doubt. 
I begin the story at the beginning. Once upon a time the universe began. [ am agnostic 
about cosmology. but any secular theory will do. For convenience. let us ass ume that in the 
beginning was the '·big bang," as a result of which the uni ve rse could have been composed of 
matter or anti-matter. fn the event, it turned out to be matter. Then a very great deal of physical 
lifting and haulin g took place over a very long time. Now. thi s process was and is entirely 
governed by the physical laws of the uni verse . This thought is expressed ni cely in Bernard 
Malamud' s noveL Pictures ()/ Fide/man.' A light bulb begins to speak in li ght to the 
protagonist, Fic!elman. and gives him advice . Fidelman asks for gu idance to follow the advice 
and the bulb says . .. l will show you the way but f can ·t go with you. Up to a point but not 
further if you know what I mean. A bulb is a bulb. Light I got but not fee t. After aiL thi s is the 
Universe . everything is laws ." All those laws operated upon all th at matter to produce those 
features of the universe that have existed in the past. that ex ist now. and that will ex ist in the 
future. Among th ese features is our planet. Earth. on which those physical processes 
ul timately produced organic. biological life form s. 
Those li fe form s evol ved into wondrously di verse creatures. so me of which . including 
ourse lves. are '·social'' animal s. To the best of our knowledge. the soc ial life of most of these 
creatures. eve n hi ghl y complex forms, operates entirely. or almost entirely. '· in stinctually ... 
That is. primarily the genetic code provides these creatures with a repertoire of socia l 
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organi zation and behavior that is not self-consciously eva luated. adopted. or revised by those 
creatures . Human beings are not only social. however. Evoluti on has also endowed us with 
self-consciousness and the capacity for reason. "Instinct" may motivate our sociability. but 
compared to other creatures on thi s planet. it puts onl y the loosest limits on the forms that 
sociability takes. Among the species that inhabit our planet. only human beings act sel f-
consciously for reasons and live in societies governed by behavior-guiding norms that are 
used in practical reasonin g. We are the onl y creatures whose behavior is reason-responsive . 
This means th at we are the only creatures to whom the questions. "Why did you do th at?" and 
·'How should we behave')" can properly be addressed and an swered with reaso ns. To the bes t 
of our knowledge. only human beings kill each other as a result of di sputes about the answers 
to such questions. 
How could it be otherwise'J Sociable. self-conscious creatures that reason have a lot of 
work to do if they are to live together at all successfully . They will need norms to guide their 
interac tions. Many of these norms may simply solve ubiquitous coordination problems. But 
not all norms solve only these problems. For example. norms about when it is acceptable to 
kill another human being involve more than simple coordinati on problems. The norms may 
be temporall y and geographically di verse and differenti al importance may attach to similar 
norms in different times and places. but norms there mu st be for creatures such as oursel ves . 
lt is nearly impossible to imagine a society that we could inte lligibly consider human that 
ex isted without norms. 
Norms in turn create in people mutual expectations of each other that vary in strength and 
importance. Incleecl. we are probabl y the only creatures on Earth that consciously have 
normati ve expectati ons of each other and that make evalu ati ve judgments when those 
expectations are sati sfied or breached. Normative judgment appears to be an omnipresent and 
unique feature of human social ex istence . An interes tin g fea ture of human nonnati ve 
judgments. which have propositi onal content. is that they often motivate our emotion al 
reacti ons. If so meone pushes me and I fall hard, my emotional response will depend on why 
I was pushed. If it was clone to save me from dange r. I will fee l grateful: if it was clone to hurt 
me. I will fee l angry. rese ntful. indi gnant. What emotion s we fee l in response to the 
sati sfaction or breach of ex pectati ons may be largely culturall y relati ve. but an emotion al 
response to normati ve j udgment seems to be another omniprese nt aspect o f human 
interacti on. Once again. a society in which members did not have emutional responses to 
norm ati ve j udgments woul d not be recogni zably human. 
In sum. creatures built like ourselves inevitabl y willli \e in groups th at have norm s. whi ch 
in turn create ex pectations that generate emotional responses to their satisfacti on or breach. [t 
is di fficult to im ag ine that these ge neral aspects of hum an life woulcl no/ ex ist unless human 
consc iousness anc! the capac ity for emoti onal res ponse were radicall y altered ... Brave new 
world .. hasn· t arri ved nor has anyo ne yet gi ven an ul timatel y convinc ing reason why we 
should has ten its arriva l-although many have tried-so I propose for the nonce that vve tal\.e 
ourselves largely as we fin d us. 
So far this abst ract story is largel y desc ripti ve. rooted in a loose. but not implausibl e. 
evolut ionary biological accounL and it does not co mmit anyone who be li ev~s it to any specific 
form of moral or political life. It commits one onl y to believing that among human beings 
there will inev itabl y be a moral and political life . that there will be norms. nonnati ve 
expec tation s. and reac tion s to th e satisfaction or breach of those ex pectations. It appli es 
equall y \V ~II to any time and place within recorded hi story. and l suspec t that it has been true 
since homo sapiens fir st used language to reg ul ate social life. I free ly conl'ess that the story is 
a littl e bit .. essentiali st .. about human nature. but thi s essence . although important, is not 
te rribl y limi ting. The story is also a .. determini st'. or .. uni ve rsa l causa ti on' · story, th at is. an 
account that assumes that what happened was the ou tcome of a lawl\!1 se t of ph ys ica l 
processes ope1·atin g on antecedent conditi ons. 
At thi s point in the story. one might fairl y as l\. why any defe nse- a normati \'e tasl\.-of 
moral responsibility or any other cultural artifact is necessary if the determin is tic or universa l 
cau sat ion acco unt is true. If. that is. what ex ists is the outcome or antecedent eve nts anclthe 
la\vs of the unive rse operating on those eve nts. then isn·t ir true th at no other outcome was 
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possible? If so. any evaluation or defense of "what is" is. itself. determini stically or causally 
inevitable and also needs no defense. Indeed. my students al ways ask just this question just 
about now. Well. in my story. the answer is . yes and no. 
Yes. it is true that culture and everything else are the products of deterministi c or causal 
processes, or something very close to them. ' but. no, it does not follow that cultural artifacts 
cannot and should not be normatively evaluated. Permit me to share how I attempt to 
demon strate thi s conclusion to my students. I wordl ess ly move to the desk at the front of the 
class and then sit silently and as absolutely st ill as I can until the anxiety in the room builds 
to uncomfortable levels. I then ask the students what I was doing. They of course haven't a 
clue about why their professor behaves so bizarrely. The answer I give is this: ··I am waiting 
for determinism to happen.'' They titter at the absurdity of the sta tement, and we ll they should. 
Although the winds, tides, bacteria. and most non-human species do "wait'" for determinism 
to happen. human beings do not. We cannot help but consciously think. deliberate. reason. and 
guide our actions by reasons. We' re stuck. It' s just the way we are and there is no getting 
around it. Some unforeseen biophysical calamity or new technologies might change our 
nature. But short of such scary sce narios. there is no alternative but to deliberate and to act 
based on deliberation. 
Even if our actions are determined. they make a difference. Determined actions can cause 
pleasure or pain . can create wealth or poverty. can be kind or cruel. INe discu ss. argue. fight. 
and eve n kill about morals and politics prec isely because the moral and political reg ime in 
which we live makes an enormou s difference to our well-being and tlouri shing. Although we 
may be determined creatures. we are not automatons. Determined deliberation and intentional 
action are distinguishabl e from refl exive bodi ly movements. We can' t wait for determini sm to 
happen. We determine what determinism di cta tes. 
The tools we use to engage in such determ ined deliberation are given to us by our hi story 
and culture. but the human capacity for rati onality and prac ti cal reason necessarily infects the 
process everywhere and always. How could anyone ever rationally persuade anybody else 
about anything. except by giving reasons'' Unless \VC are sati sfied to "conv ince" by force. all 
that we have is reason. however flawed it may be and however ofte n it may lead us as tray. The 
best we can do is to try to give good reasons and to yie ld to what seem to be better reasons 
when they appea r. Although "reason" and "rationality" are not self-defining. uncontrovcrsially-
clefinecl te rms, it is almost imposs ible to conceive of a cu lture that will not inc lude among its 
too ls some criteria for what counts as good reason with in the cu lture. Arguments that are 
logically sound- within defe nsible convent ions of logic-and factua lly acc urate- \vithin 
defensible epi stemological conventi ons-should yield on ly if they lead to a social and moral 
regime that there is other. better reason to reject. J propose to use ord inary logic ami 
commonsense rati onality- as they have bee n given to me and as they appear reasonable to 
accept- to continue my story. Anyone who objec ts needs to give me good reason not to and 
anyone who tri es to do so has already accepted th<:: most general claim being made. 
It is impossible to deny that we hold each other mor;1 ll y accountabl e ancl have a rich series 
of pract ices that retlect this response . But what arc we do ing vvhen we hold peop le morally 
responsible for their conduct? A defense of moral responsibility should begin with an 
interpretation o i' our pract ices that answers this question. I have previously suggested that 
human bei ngs possess the innate capac ity to respond emotional ly to nmmative j udg men ts. 
Following Sir Peter Strawson and more recent Strawsonians. especially Jay Wallace. I 
contend that holding peop le responsib le is an expression of thi s capac ity: it is the disposition 
to fee l appropriate emoti ons when mora l expectat ions ar<:: sati sfi ed or breached and to ex press 
those emotions in the appropri ate way.; The content of the expectat ions . the appropriate 
emotions. ancl the approp riate express ion of them may vary. but this is the mean ing of the 
abstraction. "to hold someone morall y respons ible ... In our culture . the common emotional 
responses to breach are rese ntment. indignation. and anger: the comm on emotional response 
to compliance is gratitude. Depending on the nature and magnitude of the expecta tion. the 
appropriate express ions of the reac ti on to breac h can range from mild disapproval to painful 
puni shment : the appropriate express ions of the reacti on to compliance can range from mil d 
approval to substantial rewards. 
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The va riou s ways in whi ch the moral reacti ve emotions can be expressed mu st be 
normativel y justified because they have the pote ntial to create benetit or to cause harm. I say 
thi s not as an assertion of theore tical truth divorced from our practices. but as an express ion 
of our internal pract ices. of what we require of each other morall y. As a general ru le. benefit s 
and harms should not be awarded for ··no good reason··: there should be good reason among 
creatures who se lf-consciously decide how they should live together. People should be praised 
and bl amed. rewarded and puni shed. on ly if they deserve it, only if it is fair to respond in these 
ways to thei r conduct. To claim that reason should not gui de the distribution of rewards and 
harm s is to adopt an arati onal stance . But why should l or anyone else do this unless we are 
given good reason to do it'1 
Moral expectations give people good reason to behave properl y. It is fair to ho ld people 
to such expectat ions only if they have the general capacity to grasp and be guided by reason. 
If they are incapable of understanding expectati ons or of using them in practical reasoning. it 
would be unjustified and unfair to prai se and bl ame them for compliance and breach. Thus. 
\Ve exempt people from moral responsib ility under two general conditi ons that indi cate that 
the agent cou ld not grasp or be guided by reason. The first is cases in which the agent has not 
acted. that is. her movements did not meet the criteria for human act ion. Refle xes an d other 
physica ll y invo luntary bodi ly movements are the prime ex amples. The second is cases in 
whic h the age nt has acted. but the ac ti on is excused . Non-culpabl e ignorance. irrationality. 
ancl compul sion are classic exampl es. 
Under either condition-no act ion or excused acti on- we do not th ink it is ju s til~ ed to 
!"eel and express what would otherwise be the appropri ate emot ion fo r compliance or breac h. 
For examp le. if a driver has an unforeseeable seizure and blacks out. during which the car 
causes injury. we would not just ifiably be angry at and sanct ion the driver for the moral failure 
to take care whiie operating a dangerous machine. Or. under the sa me circum stances. if the 
c~tr plows harmlessly into a haystack. saving a passe nger from an otherwi se imminent but 
unfo reseeab le crash with an approaching vehi cle. the unconsci ous dri ver does not dese rve 
thanks fo r saving the passenger 's life. 
Alt hough l have descri bed the pract ice of holding peop le morall y responsible as a 
predispos iti on to an emotional reaction and an ex press ion of that react ion. hol ding responsibl e 
1s no t a purely emot ional response . A mora l react ive emoti on and its ex press ion are 
.tppropriatc onl y if a moral expectation was co mplied with or breac hed and the agent was 
Ct]Xtbk or bei ng guided by reason. The criteria fo r mor~tl expect~Hion s . act ion. and reason may 
be \ ~triable. but they are al ways propositi onal and have truth \ ~tlue. Moreover. our pract ice of 
holding peopl e morally responsible is not simply an instrum ental behavioral dispos iti on to 
emit responses that are mea nt to increase or decrease the probab il ity that particular behavior 
wil l occ ur in the futme. ' Holding peop le morally respo nsible ex presses a normative . 
re trospective evalu at ion of an agent 's conduct. inde pendent of whe th er that evalu ation has 
pos iti\·e or negative co nseq uences. 
ln sum. the di spos ition to fee l appropriate emotions when moral nmms are breac hed or 
:<trisfied and the consequent ex pressions of normati ve judgment atl irm and enforce the 
ine\itable. :tecess~try norms of behavior that ex ist in hum an socie ty and that gi ve people 
; ·easO !l~ to ~ee l. After all , the ele ments of nature. such as the w inds and the tide. and non-human 
sp <~ cie s do nut need norm s or rules of conduct to tell them how to behave . nor clo we fee l 
!llor ~tl emotions towards them. un less we anthropomorphize them. I assume th at ex press ing 
normative judgments and affirming and enforcing norms co uld be accompl ished by means 
utiler than holding peop le morall y respon sible. although I also ctssu me that thi s vvo uld be a 
di!'!"icul t tr ick to pull off. Consis tent \Vith thi s assu mption . however. the defe nse of 
respon:;ibility will still requi re :.t story about why it is des irable-why. that is. hum~ln beings 
sh ould rationally des ire to li ve in soc iet ies that hold people re \ponsibl e for their in te ntional 
,_·undue!. 
Shoul d our concepts and practices of mcmtl responsibility be maintained·' The firs t li ne 
o !' clttack is the fam ili ar one. alluclecl to ab(we. rooted in an xieti es abou r dete rmini sm or 
uni ,"<::rsa! causation. I previously suggested that va riou ,; inte rperso nal. socia l conce pts and 
;xac ti ces \verc real and coul cl be rati onally interpreted c\·e n if de terminism or uni ve rsa l 
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causati on were true. Determinist critics of responsibility-so called ·'hard determinists" or 
·· inco mpatibili sts"-can concede these points. but they argue nonetheless that responsibility 
isn't really rea l; it 's just a made-up , as-if fantas y. 5 Thus, there is "nothing" desirable to 
maintain , and it is entirely unfair to maintain prac tices dependent on such fantas ies . After all , 
if all eve nts in the universe are determined or caused products of antecedent events and laws 
over which living human beings have no control, how can we possibly be responsible for 
anything" Such critics believe that unless we have contra-causal freedom (or some such 
thing)- the ability to act unconstrained by the causal, determini stic processes of the 
universe-then "real" responsibili ty is not poss ibl e. And neither, it must be conceded if thi s 
is correc t, are "real" justice and fairness possibl e, which presuppose rational, responsible 
responses of rational creatures to each other. If correct, thi s assertion of the incompatibility of 
determini sm and responsibility (and justice) is powerful. because the metaphys ics of contra-
causal freedom are prepos terous, and in Strawson 's word, "panicky." 
My account of responsibility is compatibl e with the truth of determinism or universal 
causation, however. Even if our behavior is determined, we are determined to have a 
susceptibility to feel and express emotions in response to compli ance with or breach of moral 
expectations. and some hum an beings are capable of being guided by reason and others, such 
as small children and some people with severe mental disorder, are not. Responsibility does 
not require god-like causal powers. It requires only th at mature human beings have the 
general capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason." a capacity we firml y believe we 
have. It is fair, we believe, to hold accountable another person who is capable of reason , a 
person who can use moral expectations as premi ses in practical reasoning. A person wh o 
sutlers an unforeseen seizure may be causall y responsibl e for harms that result , but the person 
does not deserve, in the full est sense, our co ndemnation and sancti on. Such a response would 
be unfa ir. If we didn't beli eve th at mature hum ans were capable of grasping ancl being 
intluenced and guided by reason . we woulcln·r be reading or writing articles like thi s one in 
the hope of learning or being guided ourselve s or o f persuading or guiding others . Few people 
read or write academi c articles solely for recreati on or eve n ad vancement. 
If contra-causal freedom is necessary fo r .. real" ' responsibility-an assertion that tlows 
!'rom an external point of vi ew and critique of rcsponsibility'-then "real " responsibility does 
not ex ist. but I deny that it is necessary. If we all had god-like powers. then I suppose that 
there would be no ques tion about res ponsibility. We arc not gods . of co urse, but in a sense. 
we arc god-like in th at we mu st create and do have the capacity to rev ise our concepts and 
practices. eve n if we lack contra-causal freedom. And those crea tions arc '· real enough· · for 
me. ewn if they lack the alleged metaphys ical ped igree of contra-causal fre edom. 
Yes. we create and revise our responsibility co ncepts and practi ces over and over again 
as we go al ong. just as we do with the co ncept of justi ce and its prac tices . But what we 
construct is rea l. it ex presses our nature. and it has the all-too concrete potenti al to benefit or 
harm us. to 2: ive our lives more or less meanin 2: . or to ex tin 2: ui sh those li ves . The norms o f 
responsibility are li ke the rules or law. the de mands of justi ce. and the in stituti ons of 
govern me nt: all have the enormou s potenti al for good and ill. and they can be defend ed bes t 
by the good reason that we can give for them. rather than by a found ational metaphys ics . 
Practi cal and theoreti cal reason is all that we have to dev ise and defe nd our conce pts and 
instituti ons. Given the bi ological limits of our be ings. what more could we rea listica ll y and 
reasonabl y want'J 
The retrospecti ve . evalu ative concept or moral responsibility that we now possess and 
empl oy may be real enough. but is it des irabl e·) T he second line o f attack on responsibility 
suggests that it is an irrational concept. lf one !'unction of moral responsibility is to guide 
interpersonal li fe. then perhaps. as many have sugges ted. we could replace it. for exampl e. 
with a purely prospec tive . purely conseq ucnti a li st scheme.' But in addition to bein g 
inadequate in te rpretations of current concepts and prac tices (W~1llace S..J.-6). abandoning our 
curre nt concept and prac tices would not be rati onal beca use it would impove ri sh our li ves. 
Retrospec ti ve. evaluati ve moral responsibili ty is crucial to our se nse of ourse lves as 
persons. as objec ts of dignity and respect. and it coheres with other moral noti ons of supreme 
im portance . such as desert . fairn ess. and j us ti ce . to which we are firml y committed. 'What 
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makes us di stinctive ly human and what gives all these concepts full meaning is our capacity 
for reason. vvhich in turn makes us capable of ge nuine normative eva luat ion and appropriate 
objects of such evaluat ion. Other sentient creatures can suffer and deserve to be treated 
without unnecessary pain, but we are the only creatures capable of leading full y moral li ves. 
Thi s is why. I believe. we think of ourselves as occupying a unique position among the life 
forms on earth and it is a fo undational part of what gives our lives dignity. meaning, and 
worth. To give up thi s sense of ourselves would abandon our humanity. 
Responsibility is desirable also because it contributes to the creat ion and maintenance of 
moral communities. Personhood, desert, and responsi bility are all moral noti ons. inextri cably 
intertwined in ou r moral lives . When we express the reacti ve emoti ons through appropriate 
practices, we atlirm and deepen our commitment to common moral obligati ons that bind us 
toge ther. To diminish or to abandon moral responsibility would be to weaken those ties and 
the comm unities that nurture us. Creatures capable of graspin g and being guided by good 
reason deserve our moral praise when they comply with our moral expectati ons . and they 
deserve our bl ame when they transgress . To make thi s cl aim does no t commit one to any 
concrete sc heme of expectati ons, rewards. and sanctions. It simpl y commits one to the 
recognition that we are the only creatures capable of being guided by reason and that this is 
an inev itable. cruci al feature of our soci al li ves . 
Many people object to holding people morally responsibl e. for fea r that thi s practice 
readily produces moralistic. puniti ve. and cruel responses . at least when ex pectations are 
breached . It is of course true that when human beings are angry because they have been 
harmed . they can become incredibl y self-ri ghteous and hideously cruel. Holding people 
morally accountabl e can be used to sat isfy such unworthy responses, but thi s is not inherent 
in the practice. Virtuall y any human practice can be turned to vic ious use. but nothing in my 
story compels moral responsibility to be applied harshl y. l'vl y account is consistent with a 
tender, fo rgiving. or converse ly. a tough. stri ct set of norms and practices, and neither need be 
cruel. It presupposes on ly that it is fair to hold accountable beings that reason and th at are 
capabl e. as most adults demonst rabl y are. of being guided by good reason . 
Another conception of human life is. [ suppose. possible. For examp le. we could treat 
each other like bacteri a. 1 refer to thi s as the good bacteri a/bad bacteria part of the story. Some 
bacteria that inhabit our gastrointest inal system. our gut. are cruc ial to the smooth operati on 
of the sys tem. They are the good bac teria. We try to enhance their su rvival ancl do nothing to 
inhibit their growth . On occasion. alas . our guts are invaded by bac teria tha t interfere with the 
proper operati on or the system. causing various unseeml y ailments. and in extreme cases. 
de ath. These arc th e bad bacteria . We spend a fair amount o f· effort tryi ng to preve nt these 
critters from ente rin g our gut in suffi cient numbers to overwhelm the body"s natural defe nses. 
ancl if the natural defen ses fa il. we try with vari ous techn iq ues. such as antibioti cs. to kill the 
offensive . bad bacteria. Now. despite th e potential of various bacteria to confer benefits and 
harm s. as the case may be . and despite our conseq uential. substantial e fforts ro dea l with these 
bacteria. no one holds either kind of bacteri a responsible for smooth or rocky gastrointe stinal 
runcti oning. and \\'e wou ld n' t dream of prai sing or blaming bacteria. We treat bac teria purely 
as objects. and never as subjects. as agents. 
We could. by an al ogy. sim ply treat each other like bacteria. as potentiall y benefici al or 
harmfui objects. and ac t accordingly. Thi s conception of peop le would su pport a purely 
predicti ve and pre vc nti\'C scheme of soc ial organi zation in whi ch the emotional and soc ietal 
respon se to the organ ism coul d be entirely independent of the moral goodness or badness of 
the person·s conduct. We don' t at present have the emotion al repe rtoire or the predi ctive and 
therapeuti c technology to institute thi s vision very prec ise ly or crrect ive ly. but this is a 
technoquibblc. Tn principle. it is a possible form of soc ial organi zati on. Indeed. in some senses 
we mi ght all be "safe r: · and . to some. social life might appear mo1·e rational if the show ran 
along these lines. But thi s is a show that I think virtuall y any of us would happil y mi ss. 
prec isely becau se we are importantl y different from bacteria. They are not moral creatures. 
At th is stage in the story. 1 am appealing as much to ~ ~ \ ision as to J logical arg ument. 
Why would a rational agent wish to give up a conception of self as a moral creat ure·) No one 
would do th is. fo r ex am ple. just because determini sm were true. A rati onal age nt would clo it 
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on ly if it promoted some vision of human flourishing the agent was willing to defend. If you 
are still convinced that moral responsibility contributes little and should be abandoned, try the 
following thought experiments. Imagine, first, that someone intentionally injures you, 
knowing that you are incapable of retaliating, because the person enjoys your pain and the 
feeling of dominance that cruelty produces. You of course react not only by feeling pain. but 
surely with anger. too. Your physical pain is no worse than it would be if an accident of nature 
had caused it. but your entire reac tion is quite different. Do you rea ll y want to treat the bully 
as if she were just a larger ·'bad bacteria'"' Should your response be simply that which most 
decreases the likelihood that the bully would strike again'' Do you think you (and others) 
could learn not to feel indignation, resentment. and anger, as opposed to regret '~ Would we all 
be better off if we no longer had these reactions and expressed them to each othe r '~ Would life 
then be more rational ') Better? Would human nouri shing increase') 
Now imagine that rou have unjustifiably injured another person. Probably, in addition to 
whatever "positive'· emotion is created, you will al so feel guilt or shame or some other critical 
emotion. But how should you feel about yourself'/ If you promi se not to do it again and really, 
really mean it, should that be the end of the matter'' Of course. unpleasant emotions like guilt 
or shame may decrease the likelihood that you will cause such injury again , but should that 
be the onl y point of these emotions'~ How should the victim feel about you'' Is resentment and 
condemnation just irrational or silly, especially if you promise to be a good bacterium from 
novv on ') Finally. imag ine that we all learned our lesson and ceased to have these irrational 
responses to violations of moral expectations. What would soc iety be like'~ How would we 
feel about ourse lves and each other? What would be the role of community or the arts in such 
a society') 
My story has neither a happy nor a sad ending. We are in the midst of the story and have 
no idea whether or how it will end. Human social life will surely end only when human beings 
cease to ex ist as a spec ies in its current form. As long as recogni zable humans ex ist. however. 
they will create meaning and norm s from the cultural too ls and co ncepts available to them. 
And hi story and anthropology teach us that incred ible diversity is poss ible. We cannot even 
predict that there vvi II be prog ress. Progress is itse lf a soc ial! y constmctecl moral notion. 
subject to diverse interpretations. 
If- and thi s is a bi g ·'if'- we insist on trying to subject our co ncepts and practices to 
reason. our capacity for reaso n surely sets so me limits on what co ncepts and tools a society 
can clclopt that will rema in relatively stable. Now. of course. one can claim that reason is not 
the road to moral or any other kind of progress and th at it is a mi stake to try to subject our 
lives to the di ctates of good reason. But the only reason anyone should accept such a claim is 
because the claimant gives good reason to abandon reason. Force and the threat of force are. 
of course . good instrumental reasons to yie ld to a stronger opponent-infrahuman spec ies do 
this all the time-but fear is not. in itself. a good moral reason for action. 
No culture ex ists or changes without indi vidual agenh to perpetuate. critici ze and modify 
it. Surely no cu lture changes unless individuals believe that it should and then act on that 
belief. We are all the creators as we ll as the consumers of our culture. As such. we are all 
storytellers as we ll as characters in the story. 'vVe have been born in a time and place in which 
we have been taught to tru st reason, to hope for rationality and objectiv ity. Although we 
should not make reason a feti sh. we ignore it at our peril. Because our norms and rul es mu st 
be expressed in language . there will always be ambigui ty and room for interpreta ti on ancl 
argumentation. There will never be absolute agreem ent on what reason demands. even among 
people who share the same ends and the sa me vision of human flourishing. The best we ca n 
do is to give each other the best reasons we can for why we shou ld live together one way 
rather than another. why we should prefer one set of norms. rul es and in stituti ons to others. 
ancl try to li sten to others' reasons as openl y as poss ible. 
Whether or not taking moral responsibility seriously is a given of interpersonal life. it is 
fair and fundamentall y enhances personhood. di gnity and res pect. It al so facilitates the 
formati on and maintenance of moral communities. These goa ls are so important that it is hare! 
to imagine giving them up , at least not until someone gives us goocl reason that we should. 
And. if the relatio n between responsibility and these othe r end s is as close as it appears to be. 
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it is hard to imagine what reasons would pe rsuade us to abandon respon sibility. If yo u w ish 
to give it up, assuming that it is poss ible to do thi s, what social concepts and prac tices do you 
propose to adopt instead to respond to the good and ev il we do to each other, to the inte nti onal 
acts o f kindness and cruelty of interpersonal life? What kind of society will it be? Tell us a 
story that gives us good reason to hear it again. 
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